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Abstract: This paper studies the effect of punishment severity on jury decision-making using a 
large archival data set from the Old Bailey Criminal Court in London from 1715 to 1900.  We 
take advantage of three natural experiments in English history, which result in sharp decreases 
in punishment severity: The offense specific abolition of capital punishment in the 1800s, the 
temporary halt of penal transportation during the American Revolution, and the abolition of 
transportation in 1853. Using a difference-in-differences design to study the abolition of the 
death penalty and pre-post designs to study the temporary and permanent halts to transportation, 
we find that decreasing expected punishment (especially via the end of the death penalty), had 
a large and significant impact on jury behavior, generally leading to the jury being ‘harsher’. 
Moreover, we find that the size of the effect differs with defendants’ gender and criminal 
history. These results raise concerns about the impartiality of juries as well as the implicit 
assumption often made when designing and evaluating criminal justice policies today – that the 
chance of conviction is independent of the harshness of the penalty.  
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1. Introduction 
More than 50 years ago, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared a war on crime. Numerous 
policies have since been implemented that have increased expected punishment and are 
responsible for the dramatic – almost four-fold – growth in the US state and federal prison 
populations in the last 35 years.1 A new era of reforms aiming to reverse this ‘get tough on 
crime’ attitude by decreasing sentence severity is currently being ushered in, resulting in a 
(slowly) falling prison population. These reforms range from abolishing or reducing mandatory 
minimums to abolishing the death penalty, which still exists in 31 states today.2  
In this context, extensive empirical research has been conducted testing the basic 
implication of Becker’s (1968) economic model of crime: put simply, does harsher punishment 
deter crime?3 In the Becker model, individuals compare the expected utilities of legal versus 
criminal activities, where the latter is a function of expected punishment. Expected punishment, 
in turn, is a function of the chance of getting caught, the chance of conviction, and the severity 
of punishment. The existing literature typically emphasizes changes in expected punishment 
driven by punishment severity, but taking the chance of conviction as exogenous. We explicitly 
study this underlying assumption using three natural experiments in English history associated 
with large and sharp changes in punishment severity – the offense specific abolition of capital 
punishment in the 1800s, the temporary halt of transportation during the American Revolution, 
and the abolition of transportation in 1853. Do changes in punishment severity affect jury 
decision-making and the chance of conviction, i.e. is the chance of conviction endogenous? 
Moreover, are juries impacted by punishment severity in a way that is unequally applied across 
defendants?  
 A jury’s job is to determine whether the facts of the case prove beyond reasonable doubt 
the defendant’s guilt; the jury’s evaluation of the evidence should not be affected by factors 
external to the case. Whether this holds in practice has been recently studied in the empirical 
literature with respect to the demographic characteristics of the jury or contemporaneous media 
coverage during a trial.4 There is limited research, however, on the role of potential punishment 
and the existing research is generally unable to disentangle the effect of the severity of the 
                                                 
1 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Statistics, Total Adult Correctional Population 1980-2014 on the Internet at 
www.bjs.gov (visited 06,03,2016). 
2 States recently abolishing the death penalty include Connecticut (2012), Maryland (2013) and Nebraska (2015). 
See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
3 See Chalfin and McCrary (forthcoming) and Nagin (2013) for recent reviews of the deterrence literature. For 
selected examples, see Lee and McCrary (2009), Levitt (1996), and Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009). 
4 See Anwar, Bayer and Hjalmarsson (2012, 2014, 2015, and 2016), Lee (2014), and Lehmann and Blair-Smith 
(2013) for studies of juror demographics, including race, age, gender, and political affiliation, and Philippe and 
Ouss (2015) for the role of the media. 
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punishment from the severity of the offense; Devine’s (2012) review of the so-called ‘severity-
leniency hypothesis’ finds that no firm conclusions can be made.5 Related to that is the concept 
of ‘jury nullification’: does the jury take the law into their own hands based on their own ethical 
beliefs, for instance by acquitting a defendant for whom the facts prove guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt? While we are unaware of empirical studies of this question, there is anecdotal evidence 
throughout history, including defendants charged with helping slaves escape or Vietnam War 
protesters.6 
 To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the first to study the causal effect of 
changes in punishment severity on jury decision-making using a quasi-experimental research 
design. Our identification strategy is unique to this literature in that we capitalize on changes in 
sentencing laws that increase or decrease punishment severity for a given criminal offense. This 
contrasts previous research that asks whether juries are less likely to convict defendants charged 
with more serious offenses (e.g. robbery versus burglary), where one cannot disentangle the 
differential punishment severity across offenses from the differential characteristics of the case 
and/or evidence.  
 England in the 18th and 19th centuries provides a colorful context during which to study 
changing punishment. In the early 1700s, imprisonment was practically non-existent and the 
primary sanctions were transportation to the Americas and execution; in fact, there were more 
than 200 capital offenses by 1800, a period that became known as The Bloody Code. The British 
penal system was put into an unexpected crisis when the American Revolution abruptly 
eliminated the Americas as a penal colony in 1776. This led to the first, albeit temporary, mass 
use of prison sentences; transportation did not officially resume until the establishment of a 
penal colony in Australia. However, by the end of the 19th century, capital punishment had been 
abolished for most offenses by a series of offense-specific Acts in the mid-1800s, transportation 
had been (mostly) abolished in 1853, and the modern-day prison sentence was the primary form 
of punishment.  
                                                 
5 Experimental studies of the severity-leniency hypothesis include Vidmar (1972), Kaplan and Simon (1972), 
Hamilton (1978) and Freedman et al (1994). However, mock jury studies typically focus on homicides, contain 
much lower stakes than real jury trials, and only indirectly manipulate expected punishment by altering the choice 
of offenses on which the jury could convict. The handful of existing non-experimental studies (i) again proxy for 
expected punishment with charge severity and (ii) use small samples, ranging from 79 trials in  in Indiana (Devine 
et al 2004) to 293 trials in Baltimore (Flowers, 2008). Other archival studies include Werner et al (1985) and Myers 
(1979). 
6 A recent Washington Post article (2016) provides a number of historical examples of jury nullification: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/04/08/history-is-clear-juries-were-supposed-to-be-
able-to-overturn-laws/ . 
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  To study this 200-year period, we use a data set of more than 200,000 criminal cases tried 
at the Old Bailey Criminal Court in London between 1715 and 1900.  The accounts of these 
cases were published in The Proceedings of the Old Bailey, which has in recent years been 
digitized and published by The Old Bailey Proceedings Online.7 From this remarkable historical 
data set, we extracted information identifying the unique case, the session date, the defendant’s 
name, gender and age, the offense category charged, as well as broad and detailed verdict and 
sentencing outcomes. In addition, we manually coded judge and jury names, which are available 
from 1750 to 1822, as well as criminal history from 1832 onwards.  
 Given the context, it is natural to question the external validity of our study and its 
relevance to the modern day criminal justice system.  Though transportation ‘beyond the seas’ 
clearly no longer exists, capital punishment is still used and actively debated in many countries, 
including the United States. In fact, potential jurors in a U.S. capital case can be dismissed for 
cause if they oppose the death penalty due to the implicit assumption that such an individual 
cannot be impartial – an assumption that we can empirically test in this paper. There are two 
key advantages to studying the abolition of capital punishment in this historical context. First, 
it provides a large and unambiguous decrease in punishment severity, which simply cannot be 
observed today. Second, the differential timing in the abolition of capital punishment across 
offenses allows for a difference-in-differences design to retrieve the (causal) effect of changes 
in punishment severity on jury verdicts in a single jurisdiction.  
Specifically, for each of the twenty-six offense categories in our data, we identify whether 
the offense was never, always or once capital eligible, and in the latter case the year that capital 
punishment was abolished, which ranges from 1813 (fraud) to 1856 (arson). Intuitively, our 
research design compares the change in the chance of conviction in the years surrounding the 
abolition of capital punishment for ‘treated’ offenses – i.e. those for which the capital status 
changed – to that for ‘control’ offenses – i.e. those which were never or always capital eligible. 
Such a design controls for other changes occurring during this period in both the criminal justice 
system, including the introduction of the Metropolitan Police force and the right to a defense 
attorney, and society more generally (e.g. the industrial revolution). A similar within 
jurisdiction identification strategy would be less feasible today, given a small number of capital 
                                                 
7 To the best of our knowledge, this data set has been used in just two large scale empirical studies. Voth (1998) 
used witness accounts from the Old Bailey data to reconstruct historical time use budgets (prior to the digitization 
of the Proceedings); given the time intensive nature of this kind of coding, he evaluated a little less than 8000 
cases. Vickers and Zieberth (forthcoming) use the Old Bailey online data from 1835 to 1913 to study changing 
demographic patterns in crime, finding that convicted defendants got older during this time period. It is important 
to note, however, that the Proceedings only reliably report age for those who are convicted.  
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eligible offenses. Rather, one would have to study the abolition of capital punishment across 
jurisdictions, e.g. US states, which would raise serious concerns about omitted variables even 
if such trial data could be obtained. 
Our empirical analyses find that the decrease in expected punishment arising from the 
abolition of the death penalty significantly increased the chance of conviction overall (7.6 
percentage points), and especially for offense categories classified as violent and sex offenses 
or fraud offenses (22 and 34.5 percentage points, respectively). This was accompanied by a 
significant decrease in jury recommendations for mercy – as mercy was no longer needed. For 
property offenses, there is just a small increase in the chance of conviction (1.5 percentage 
points); however, conditional on conviction, there is a large and significant reduction in the 
chance of being convicted of a lesser charge (20.3 percentage points). That is, juries were able 
to circumvent death sentences prior to the reforms for property offenses by convicting 
defendants of lesser charges that were not death eligible, e.g. for a theft of a lower value than 
the original charge. Heterogeneity analyses indicate that a jury’s reluctance to convict on a 
capital charge is not equal across defendants: juries were more reluctant to convict females than 
males of a capital offense. Though less precise than the gender effect, we also find suggestive 
evidence of a similar reluctance to convict first time offenders than repeat offenders. To 
interpret these results as causal, we make a number of identifying assumptions (see the 
discussion in Section 4.2), including parallel trends and that the timing of the offense specific 
abolition was random. Perhaps more importantly, we implicitly assume that the quality of 
evidence presented to the jury did not change with the reforms, since an increase in the quality 
of evidence could also feasibly yield the same pattern of results. However, we provide direct 
empirical evidence that there is no significant increase in the quality of evidence, which we 
measure using keyword searches for police, evidence, and witness on The Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online. 
Almost all offense categories were ‘treated’ contemporaneously to both the temporary 
halt and permanent abolition of transportation, which unfortunately limits us to simple pre-post 
research designs in these contexts. Our baseline specifications include offense, month, and 
judge fixed effects as well as a vector of defendant and jury controls.8 As a result of the 
American Revolution, the share of sentences to transportation decreased from 75% to 0% in 
1776, and resulted in an increase in sentences to prison and manual labor in the hulks of ships. 
                                                 
8 Judge and jury controls are only available for the temporary halt of transportation while criminal history is only 
available upon its abolition. 
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This sharp and unexpected change in expected punishment is exogenous to the criminal justice 
system and a unique feature of this natural experiment concerning penal transportation. Our 
empirical analyses find that defendants charged with transportation eligible non-capital 
offenses, for which punishment severity unambiguously decreased during the war, were about 
five percentage points more likely to be convicted as a result of the halt of transportation.  A 
comparable effect is not seen for transportation eligible capital cases, for which the change in 
sanction severity is ambiguous given that both death sentences and prison hulks were substitute 
punishments for transportation. Our analysis of the abolition of transportation in 1853 (at which 
point about 25% of cases were sentenced to transportation) does not find a significant effect on 
conviction rates. This non-effect is seen in both a simple pre-post design and a difference-in-
differences specification using offenses with a relatively low share of transportation offenses 
prior to the reform as the control group. The obvious weakness in the simple pre-post 
identification strategies – namely the inability to conclusively separate the effect of the reform 
from other things changing at the same time – limits the extent to which these transportation 
results can be interpreted causally; we discuss the specific potential confounders in more detail, 
particularly with respect to the American Revolution, in Section 5.1. Nevertheless, these 
‘experiments’ add to a complete picture of the role of (various degrees) of punishment severity 
in jury decision-making.  
This paper provides empirical evidence that punishment severity, and in particular 
capital punishment, may impact the ability of a jury to be impartial. The fact that abolishing 
capital punishment has such large impacts on jury behavior during a time in history when capital 
punishment still had a fairly high acceptance rate in society is striking. It is certainly suggestive 
that punishment severity – namely the chance of a death sentence – may significantly impact 
jury behavior today, a period with much less societal acceptance of the death penalty. It also 
suggests that the behavior of jurors who are not fundamentally opposed to the death penalty 
may still be impacted by the potential sanction – that is, challenging jurors who are opposed to 
the death penalty may still not result in an entirely impartial jury. Furthermore, this lack of 
impartiality may be applied unequally across defendant characteristics.9 
Aside from the question of whether punishment severity affects a jury’s ability to be 
impartial, this paper also suggests that policy makers may be missing an important channel 
                                                 
9 See Iyengar (2011) for a study of judge and jury death penalty decisions in the US. She finds that not only are 
juries more likely to apply the death penalty than judges, but also that juries are more influenced by demographic 
characteristics (such as age and race) of the offender and the victim. These findings support the hypothesis that 
juries may fail to be impartial, and that this impartiality may not be equally applied across defendants. 
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when evaluating the potential impact of a change in punishment severity. The first order 
question is whether such a change affects criminal behavior. Yet, this paper demonstrates that 
other agents in the criminal justice system may be affected, too, and importantly in a way that 
affects the chance of conviction. This makes it less clear how changing punishment severity 
impacts expected punishment as perceived by the potential criminal: if the abolition of 
mandatory minimums, for instance, results in an increase in convictions, then does expected 
punishment actually decrease? Should evaluations of such sentencing changes take the chance 
of conviction as exogenous?  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details 
on the criminal justice system and changing sentencing regimes in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Section 3 describes the data and definition of the treatment and control groups for each 
experiment. Section 4 presents the results concerning the impact of the offense specific 
abolition of capital punishment on jury verdicts, while Section 5 presents the results concerning 
transportation. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Institutional Background  
2.1. The Rise and Fall of Capital Punishment, Transportation, and Incarceration 
The years from 1715 to 1900 in England represent a period of dynamic change in the criminal 
laws governing sentencing, providing a unique natural experiment to study how changing 
expected punishment affects the behavior of various agents in the criminal justice system. This 
section provides a broad overview of the colorful history surrounding these dramatic changes 
in punishment regimes, and is based on The Old Bailey Proceedings Online, original Acts 
obtained from the Parliamentary Archives, and a number of books summarizing these Acts 
(Cook and Keith, 1975; Hitchock and Shoemaker, 2015). 
 In 1688, there were approximately 50 capital offenses. The number of offenses classified 
as capital began to rise with the Waltham Black Act of 1723, which introduced the death penalty 
for over fifty more offenses.10 In the following years, numerous parliamentary acts, in large part 
motivated by a desire to protect the property of the land-owning classes, increased the number 
of capital offenses to 160 in 1765 and more than 200 in the early 1800s.11 This period became 
known as The Bloody Code, both because of the high number of capital offenses and the public 
                                                 
10 The following offenses were listed in the Black Act and are included in the current study: fraud, perverting 
justice, animal theft, and arson. The Black Act was named after a group of poachers who blackened their faces in 
a series of poaching raids prior to 1723. 
11 Some offense categories are subdivided; for instance, there are different offenses for each type of animal theft. 
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and/or bloody spectacle made of executions. At the turn of the 19th century, even crimes that 
are viewed today as petty crimes (e.g. pickpocketing and shoplifting) were capital offences. 
 A movement to reform the criminal justice system, led by Sir Robert Peel, began in the 
1820s with the passage of the Judgment of Death Act of 1823. This Act made the death penalty 
discretionary for almost all then capital crimes except murder and treason. Though judges still 
had to officially enter a death sentence (as seen in the data), this sentence could later be reduced 
at the judge’s discretion. Additional acts reduced the number of offenses even eligible for the 
death penalty in subsequent years: 1832 (animal theft, coinage, and forgery), 1833 
(housebreaking), 1835 (mail theft), and 1837 (wounding, burglary, and robbery). Finally, in 
1861, the death penalty was abolished for wounding with the intent to kill (i.e. attempted 
murder). At this point, the only remaining capital offenses were murder (abolished in 1965), 
arson on the docks (abolished in 1971), espionage (abolished in 1981), and piracy and high 
treason (abolished in 1998). The public spectacle of executions ended in 1868. Figure 1 
demonstrates that more than 75 percent of the 26 offenses observed in the Old Bailey 
Proceedings and used in our analysis were capital eligible between 1715 and 1820. This share 
sharply decreases in the mid-1800s to about 15 percent, holds steady until the early 1860s and 
then sharply decreases again. Appendix Table 1 lists the offenses underlying this figure, and 
the corresponding acts which abolished capital punishment.  
 In the early 1700s, a not insignificant share of offenders could escape capital punishment 
by invoking the “benefit of clergy”.12  Transportation provided an alternative that individuals 
could not escape on these grounds. The first Transportation Act (1718) allowed individuals 
convicted of a clergyable offense to be transported to America for seven years; returning from 
transportation, however, was a capital offense. Transportation was unexpectedly halted in 1776 
due to the American Revolution.13 In the face of the resulting penal crisis, the Hulks Act (1776) 
was passed, allowing male convicts to be put to hard labor (dredging the river Thames) and 
held in the hulks of ships. Poor conditions on the hulks (as evidenced by the frequent escape 
attempts and high risk of death due to overcrowding, poor nutrition, and illness) and growing 
resentment towards the over-crowded prison system culminated in the eruption of The Gordon 
Riots on June 2, 1780 (Hitchcock and Shoemaker, 2015). During the weeklong riots, many 
                                                 
12 Since the middle ages, a criminal could be handed over to his church for clergyable offenses. To prevent too 
many criminals from getting off, many offenses were re-classified as non-clergyable, including, for instance, 
murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and pickpocketing in the 1500s, and housebreaking, theft from a dwelling and 
shoplifting (of more than 40 and 5 shillings, respectively), and sheep/cattle theft in the 16-1700s (Beattie, 1986). 
13 Judges were already losing faith in transportation as a deterrent: prisoners no longer feared the Americas, nor 
did they fear returning, as death sentences were often pardoned (Hitchcock and Shoemaker, 2015). 
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prisons were attacked, and prisoners escaped or were released. Military intervention ended the 
riots, leaving a temporary military presence on the streets of London and a distrust of the lower 
classes by ‘respectable Londoners’ (Hitchcock and Shoemaker, 2015).  
To combat the growing unrest among the people, the courts resumed transportation 
sentences in October 1781, despite the lack of a viable new penal colony; those receiving such 
sentences were imprisoned.  A new penal colony was finally established in 1786 in Botany Bay 
Australia, to which the First Fleet (eleven ships with more than 700 convicts) set sail in May 
1787.14 Being “transported for life beyond the Seas” to Australia was seen as a worse 
punishment than transportation to the Americas. The voyage commonly took four to six months, 
during which time many became ill or died. Upon arrival in the colonies, the convicts were 
often put to hard labor in gangs developing infrastructure. Discipline was harsh – lashes, chain 
gangs, or being sent to the most remote penal colonies in Australia.  Transportation rose 
throughout the 1820s and 30s, as it often replaced capital punishment as the maximum sentence. 
As transportation to Australia began to be perceived as inhumane, and to not deter despite its 
harshness, it was abolished through the Penal Servitude Acts of 1853 and 1857.15 The former 
replaced transportation for seven years with four-years penal servitude, retaining transportation 
for only long term cases. The 1857 Act abolished transportation for these remaining cases. 
However, it was not until October 1867 that the last convict ship set sail for western Australia. 
It is believed that about 20% of Australians today descend from the more than 160,000 convicts 
transported between 1787 and 1868. 
 The idea of imprisonment as a mainstream sentencing model dates back to the American 
Revolution, when a substitute was needed for transportation. Newgate prison, which was the 
main prison in London in the 1700s, was largely used to hold individuals awaiting trial or 
execution. With the abolition of capital punishment and transportation in the mid-1800s, the 
use of imprisonment became the primary sanction. The Millbank Penitentiary opened in 1821, 
with 860 separate cells. In 1842, the Pentonville modern prison opened, with the capacity for 
520 prisoners to spend up to 18 months in solitary confinement; many more prisons were built 
on this model in the 1840s and 1850s. 
 Our identification strategy capitalizes on the sharp changes in punishment severity 
resulting from the three natural experiments in this historical context. Figure 2 illustrates these 
                                                 
14 Four transport ships had been sent to the African coast, America and Honduras in 1782 and 1785; these 
`experiments’ were deemed failures due to the ‘mutinous spirit of the convicts’ and ‘rejection by the destination 
populations’ (Hitchcock and Shoemaker, 2015).   
15 See the Old Bailey website: http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Punishment.jsp#transportation.  
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by presenting the share of convicted offenders at the Old Bailey (as recorded in the Proceedings) 
who were sentenced to death (black line), transportation (dark grey line), and imprisonment 
(light grey line) during this almost 200-year period. First, the share of death sentences declines 
from around 25% to almost zero in the mid-1800s due to the offense specific abolition of capital 
punishment. Second, the temporary halt of transportation during the American Revolution 
results in a drop in transportation sentences from around 75% in the first half of the 1700s to 
0% during the War, with a corresponding temporary increase in prison sentences.16 Third, the 
abolition of transportation is seen in the 1850s.  
 
2.2. London and The English Jury System in the 18th and 19th Century 
The data for this study come from trials at the Old Bailey, which was the central criminal court 
for the City of London and the surrounding County of Middlesex; it was responsible for trying 
the most serious crimes, including all felonies. Criminal cases were tried by a jury upon a Grand 
Jury’s decision that there was sufficient evidence to proceed.17 The legal system at the 
beginning of this period was largely designed to protect the property of the upper classes, with 
little attention given to the rights of the defendant. This began to change in the 1800s, as the 
burden of proof shifted from the defendant to the prosecution with the presumption of innocence 
(1827) and the entitlement to defense attorneys for felony indictments (1836). Jury deliberations 
also changed in ways that likely increased the chances of a fair trial; in particular, until 1858, 
juries were not allowed fire, food or drink until a verdict was reached.18 
 For most of the period studied in this paper, the jury selection process was governed by 
the Juries Act of 1825. This Act defined men aged between 21 and 60, who resided in England 
and had land or wealth of an appropriate threshold as eligible for jury service.19 20 To be 
geographically representative, juries were separately selected for the London and Middlesex 
cases. Each year, the Churchwardens and Overseers of the parish created a master list of eligible 
                                                 
16 The high prevalence of transportation (despite the large number of capital offenses) is driven by the most 
common offense category of larceny, which is generally non-capital throughout the period. Note that share of 
sentences to prison and capital punishment do not completely offset the decrease in transportation sentences; other 
sentences (not shown), especially corporal punishment, were also used increasingly during the Revolution. 
17 After 1838, a clerk assisted in the decision making at the Grand Jury sessions, resulting in fewer dropped cases. 
18 Source: Old Bailey website online. 
19 Females became eligible for jury service with The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919. See Anwar, 
Bayer, and Hjalmarsson (2016) for an empirical analysis of the impact of adding females to the jury pool. 
20 According to the 1825 Act, a man must: (i) possess an income of 10 pounds per year from real estate or rent 
charge, or (ii) possess 20 pounds per year from a leasehold of not less than 21 years, or (iii) be a householder living 
in premises rated no less than 20 pounds per year (30 pounds in London and Middlesex), or (iv) occupy a house 
with no fewer than 15 windows. In addition, foreigners and justices of the peace were disqualified from service. 
See Bentley (1998) for a summary of both this act and the English criminal justice system in the 1800s. 
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jurors, which was delivered to the sheriff in a book to be used in the following year.  Individuals 
to be in the jury pool were selected from this master list and received a summons ten days prior 
to the beginning of each session. Though little is known about how the pool was selected 
(Langbein, 1987), the 1825 Act does detail how to seat a jury of the first 12 randomly drawn 
men not struck for cause (including ineligibility to be in the pool in the first place).21   
An underlying assumption of this paper is that the jury knew (or at least had an 
expectation of) the punishment associated with handing down a guilty verdict for various 
offenses. There are a number of reasons to believe this to be the case. First, a unique feature of 
this historical period compared to today is that the same jury tried many cases during a session. 
This is explicitly seen in the data, and in fact remained common practice until the Juries Act of 
1974 on which current law is based. From the 1840s on, the judge handed down the sentence 
immediately after the verdict was announced; that is, the jury observed the sentence for each 
case before hearing the next (Bentley, 1998). Prior to the 1840s, however, sentences were given 
to all convicted defendants on the last day of the hearings/session; thus, the jury did not have 
the chance to learn about sentencing over the course of a single session. On the other hand, 
jurors (both before and after 1840) likely formed expectations about sentencing, e.g. the chance 
of a death sentence, by (i) regularly reading the Proceedings themselves, which were published 
for public consumption, and (ii) having sat on juries in previous sessions. In fact, according to 
the Old Bailey Online, “jurors tended to serve on more than one occasion, which meant that 
almost every jury included experienced members who were familiar with court procedure.”22 
 Not surprisingly, other aspects of the criminal justice system also changed during this 
200-year period. Perhaps the most notable institutional change is the introduction of the 
Metropolitan Police in 1829 in a 10-mile radius around Charing Cross (central London) but 
excluding the City of London. It consisted of about 3,000 uniformed men tasked with patrolling 
the streets to deter crime. The catchment area expanded to a 15-mile radius to 1839, with an 
increase in the size of the force to about 4,300 men.23  
                                                 
21 According to the 1825 Act, all summoned names “shall be written on a distinct Piece of Parchment or Card, 
such Pieces of Parchment or Card being all as nearly as may be of equal Size, ….and shall … be put together in a 
Box to be provided for that Purpose, and when any Issue shall be brought on to be tried, such Associate or 
Prothonotary shall in open Court draw out Twelve of the said Parchments or Cards one after another, and if any 
of the Men whose Names shall be so drawn shall not appear, or shall  be challenged and set aside, the such further 
Number, until Twelve Men be drawn, who shall appear, and after all just Causes of Challenge allowed, shall 
remain as fair and indifferent.”  
22 https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Judges-and-juries.jsp#searchingforjurors 
23 Prior to 1829, policing was done by a local watch, which was generally decentralized through a number of 
institutions (constables, thief-takers, bow-runners, etc.). A more detailed discussion of the history of policing is 
provided on the Old Bailey online website. 
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 The late-seventeen and early-eighteen hundreds in England were characterized by the 
industrial revolution that led to agglomeration and urbanization. The introduction of train lines 
and the underground facilitated commuting within cities and contributed to the growth in city 
size. During that period, London’s population increased considerably. In 1715, the population 
amounted to around 630,000. By 1801, the year of the first census, it had grown to over one 
million, followed by a threefold growth to over three million inhabitants in 1860. By 1815, 
London was the largest city in the world. The stark population growth, as shown in Figure 3, 
was a result of a decrease in child and adult mortality, an increase in fertility, and an increase 
in migrants from both other parts of England as well as Europe and the rest of the world. 24 
 
3. Data 
3.1. The Proceedings of the Old Bailey 
The Proceedings of the Old Bailey were first published in 1674, although cases were not 
consistently recorded until 1715; the final issue was published 239 years later in 1913. After 
each monthly session, The Proceedings published an account of the criminal cases trialed at the 
Old Bailey, though the details recorded varied over time and across cases. As described on the 
Old Bailey Online, The Proceedings initially provided entertainment for the population, with 
detailed transcripts of the most colorful cases. By 1787, the Proceedings had a quasi-official 
status, as the City of London had to pay a subsidy to the publishers and, from 1778,  “demanded 
that the Proceedings should provide a ‘true, fair, and perfect narrative’ of all the trials”, leading 
to approximately equal coverage of all trials. It is important to keep in mind that the composition 
of cases tried at the Old Bailey may have changed over time as the catchment area changed 
(e.g. expanded in the 1830s to include Essex) and because there are other courts trying less 
serious crimes.  
 The records from the Proceedings have been digitized and published by The Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online.25 We obtained The Proceedings for each of the 2000 court sessions in xml 
files and extracted information identifying the unique case, session date, defendant’s name, 
gender and age, offense category, and broad and detailed verdict and sentencing outcomes. The 
broad verdict data indicates whether the jury found the defendant guilty, while the detailed 
verdict data indicates whether the defendant was found guilty of a lesser offense than charged 
                                                 
24 The discussion of population growth is sourced from the Old Bailey Online website on September 14, 2016: 
https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Population-history-of-london.jsp. 
25 The http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ website, maintained by HRI Online Publications, provides a tremendous 
amount of information about the history of The Proceedings, the digitization process, as well as a search engine. 
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or whether he pled guilty. The broad punishment variable indicates the primary sentence issued 
by the judge – death, transportation, imprisonment, corporal punishment, miscellaneous or no 
punishment. Note that the actual sentence issued by the judge is reported in The Proceedings, 
and not whether the sentence was pardoned. We do not use the detailed punishment data, which 
indicate, for instance, how the death sentence would be carried out. 
 The Proceedings contain a wealth of data, however, that are not tagged in the xml files, 
including the judge and jury names for most cases between 1750 and 1822. In fact, The 
Proceedings even list each individual juror name for most of these years. Since these data had 
to be manually transcribed, we coded the judge name, the jury name but not that of the jurors 
themselves. Each session has at least two juries – one each for Middlesex and London cases. 
As the number of cases brought to trial increase over time, so do the number of juries. Note, 
however, that because the variation in punishment severity occurs over time, one can only look 
across juries and not within juries; we can use the jury name to control for London versus 
Middlesex cases in some sub-samples. 
 Finally, we manually transcribed information on the criminal history of the offender, 
which is available from the 1830s onwards and contains information on whether the defendant 
had been in custody once before (from 1832), more than once (from 1839) or whether they were 
known associates of bad character (from 1835). Previously, criminal history was largely 
irrelevant, since most known criminals were sentenced to death or transported. 
 As some cases have multiple defendants, the final data set is created at the case by 
defendant level; each observation refers to a unique defendant. From 1715 to 1900, there are 
217,939 defendant-case observations. We exclude the 2,057 observations from 1790 to 1792, 
when The Proceedings selectively reported only guilty verdicts. Further, we exclude 751 
observations with obvious misreporting or missing values in crucial variables. The raw data 
provide a high level of detail with respect to the charged offenses. As indicated in Table 1, we 
classify the offenses into the broad categories of: property, violent, sex, fraud and other. 
However, we exclude: (i) 2,649 cases with charged offenses for which the overall number of 
trials is too low to conduct meaningful analyses,26 (ii) 865 cases with charged offenses that 
involve an unusually large number of defendants (conspiracy and riot), (iii) 186 cases for 
offenses that are redefined during the sample period and for which the redefinition cannot be 
                                                 
26 Specific offense categories dropped and the associated number of cases from 1715 to 1900 are: Bankruptcy 
(404), barratry (4), concealing a birth (474), extortion (323), game law offenses (47), illegal abortion (90), 
infanticide (328), keeping a brothel (88), petty treason (14), piracy (7), religious offenses (17), return from 
transportation (378), seditious libel (45), seditious words (35), seducing allegiance (20), tax offenses (189), 
threatening behavior (145), treason (39), vagabond (2). 
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clearly distinguished from changes in the punishment laws (kidnapping), and (iv) 4,698 cases 
for which no particular offense is given in the data (NA, other). These restrictions result in an 
analysis sample of 206,733 defendant-case observations from 1715 to 1900. Figure 4 displays 
the annual number of cases in each broad offense category over time. 
 
3.2. Coding Treatment Offenses and Years for Each Experiment 
A crucial step in our analysis is the coding of the treated offense categories and treatment years 
for each experiment. We do so using a two-step approach. First, we identify discontinuities in 
the share of death and transportation sentences in our data. Second, we compare the timing of 
the observed discontinuity to that of the historical events or changes in laws, obtained from 
historical sources whenever possible. We follow this procedure because the long time horizon 
(200 years) and complicated nature of these historical laws makes it practically impossible to 
track and find all offense-specific relevant laws. For instance, these laws often targeted very 
specific offenses within our offense categories, e.g. cow versus horse theft as opposed to animal 
theft. Some laws described a wide range of sentencing changes for multiple offenses in the same 
law, where the offense we were searching for is not clearly indicated in the title of the law. In 
addition, the date of the law often referred to the reign of the monarch rather than the Gregorian 
calendar. See Appendix Figure 1 for an example of an original law text.  
 More specifically, for both natural experiments concerning transportation, we identify the 
set of transportation eligible offenses immediately prior to the American Revolution in 1776 
and the Penal Servitude Act of 1853, respectively. Only transportation eligible offenses were 
actually treated by these two events. Thus, we assign offenses with a positive share of 
transportation sentences to the treatment groups and the remaining offenses, i.e. those with a 
zero share of transportation sentences, to the control groups. Note that treatment offenses can 
be different in the two experiments, depending on whether the offense was transportation 
eligible at that time. For instance, murder and rape were not transportation eligible in 1776, but 
by 1853, they were transportation eligible. These assignments – for both experiments – are 
indicated in Table 2.  
 For the natural experiment concerning the death penalty, we capitalize on the offense 
specific variation by coding a unique treatment period for each offense again using a data-driven 
approach.  That is, we code the first treatment year as the year when the share of death sentences 
drops to zero for that offense.27 Offenses with no such discontinuity are classified as always or 
                                                 
27 Note that there were 37 cases, which appeared to be anomalies, in that occasional death sentences occurred after 
the drop to zero. But, a close reading of the transcripts from the Proceedings made it clear that these were 
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never capital and assigned to the control group. Figure 5 provides examples – murder (always 
capital), bigamy (never capital) and robbery (reformed in 1837) – of the type of graphical 
evidence used to identify the discontinuities in the data for the capital punishment experiment. 
Each graph shows the share of death sentences over time; the solid vertical line marks the time 
of the discontinuity (the dashed vertical line mark the timing of the transportation 
experiments).28 For offenses with a discontinuity, we use the observed year of treatment to 
identify the corresponding offense specific historical Acts from the House of Lords 
Parliamentary Archives and additional online sources. Table 2 indicates treatment and control 
offenses for the capital punishment experiment, and the offense specific first years of treatment; 
Appendix Table 1 lists the original Acts abolishing capital punishment.29 
 It is important to highlight that our two-stage approach to identifying treatment and 
control offenses capitalizes on discontinuities observable in sentencing variables, which can be 
directly linked to a change in the law, and not discontinuities observable in verdicts. That is, 
we do not look for discontinuities in the outcome, but rather discontinuities in a measure of the 
‘treatment’.30 One offense category for which this may be a potential concern, however, is 
larceny. As seen in Table 1, we combine the offenses of grand larceny (theft of more than one 
shilling), petty larceny (theft of less than one shilling), simple larceny, and pocket picking into 
a single larceny offense.31 Capital punishment did exist for larceny if the stolen goods were of 
a value greater than a specific threshold, which changed over time; for instance, theft over one 
shilling was capital until 1827. In practice, however, death sentences are almost never seen for 
larceny, because the juries had the ability to convict the defendant of a lesser charge, which was 
not capital. For this reason, we demonstrate that both our overall results and property crime 
results are robust to excluding larceny. 
 Table 2 also indicates the number of observations for each offense in the treatment and 
control groups (or dropped) in the years surrounding each experiment: 1772 - 1789 for the first 
                                                 
attributable to the cases with multiple charges. For instance, a handful of burglaries were sentenced to death after 
the abolition of capital punishment for burglary; but, in every one of these cases, the person was charged with 
felonious wounding, stabbing, beating and/or striking, which was indeed a still capital eligible offense. We recoded 
such cases as the appropriately defined more severe offense.  
28 Such figures are available for each offense upon request for each experiment. 
29 We are unable to identify the specific law pertaining to the abolition of the death penalty for receiving, fraud, 
and perverting justice, and hence rely solely on the year of discontinuity in the data. Yet, given the high rate at 
which our data driven and archival law analyses correspond, we believe that the timing of the observed 
discontinuity in death sentences is a reliable measure for the time of treatment.   
30 In an ideal world, we would have identified the statute that abolished capital punishment for each offense, and 
then looked at the sentencing data (e.g. death penalty rate) to confirm that there was indeed a treatment or policy 
change. We are simply doing this in the reverse order for reasons of practicality. 
31 We combine these offenses because of how offense definitions changed over time; this allows us to continuously 
define a ‘larceny’ variable over the entire sample period which otherwise is not feasible. 
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transportation experiment (American Revolution), 1848 – 1857 for the second transportation 
experiment (the Penal Servitude Act of 1853), and +/- 10 years around the offense specific year 
that capital punishment was abolished. For offenses in the control group for the capital 
punishment experiment, we report the number of observations in a window around the median 
reform year of 1833. A number of facts stand out. First, dropped offenses are those that cannot 
be reliably studied given either the rarity with which they are observed in the Proceedings or 
that the offense-specific abolition of capital punishment falls into the same time window as the 
abolition of transportation (wounding). The most observations (277 disregarding wounding) are 
dropped in the second transportation experiment, whereas in the first transportation experiment 
just 53 observations – corresponding to eight offense categories - are dropped. Second, in the 
years surrounding both transportation experiments, the treatment groups (14,624 and 15,808 
observations, respectively) are substantially larger than the control groups (just 780 and 291 
observations). Third, there are 16 offenses for which capital punishment was abolished (15,576 
observations) and nine control offenses (39,676 observations). There is substantial variation in 
the abolition year; the earliest year is 1813 for fraud while the latest is 1856 for arson. Finally, 
the largest crime category in all three experiments is larceny; however, though more than 80% 
of the control observations in the case of capital punishment are larcenies, we again demonstrate 
that the results are robust to excluding larceny.  
 
3.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the whole sample (1715 – 1900) as well as the sub-
samples corresponding to each experiment. These descriptives provide an indication of how the 
criminal justice system is changing over this two hundred year period and a comparison 
between the treatment and control group of the capital punishment experiment. 
   From 1715 to 1900, there were 1,748 sessions at the Old Bailey, more than 900 of which 
are included in our analysis periods. In terms of the broad offense categories, 73% of cases are 
property offenses while the remaining are classified as violent (10.1%), sex offenses (1.8%), 
fraud (13.3%) and other (2%); however, property offenses comprise almost 88% of all cases 
during the American Revolution. In addition, each of these categories are represented in both 
the treatment and control groups for the death penalty experiment, although the control group 
consists of a relatively large share of property offenses and the treatment group has relatively 
more violent and fraud offenses. 
 Because defendant age is inconsistently reported in The Proceedings – it is missing for 
99% of observations in the first transportation experiment and primarily reported for just guilty 
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defendants in later years – we do not include it as a baseline control. More than 21% of 
defendants are female, with a larger share during the first transportation experiment (27%). 
Finally, slightly more than 10% of defendants in both the treatment and control groups for the 
death penalty experiment have some criminal history (in the years after such data was recorded). 
From 1750 to 1822, we see, on average, three juries per session, though one should note that 
the number of juries is increasing over time. 24% of the juries were for London (versus 
Middlesex) cases. There are 104 judges observed during this time, 30 of whom are seen during 
the first transportation experiment from 1772 to 1789. 
 The primary outcome of interest is whether the jury found the defendant guilty. The jury 
conviction rate over the entire sample period is 67.5%, but just 58.4% of cases are found guilty 
during the first transportation experiment and nearly 70% during the second transportation and 
death penalty abolishment samples. It is also clear that the practice of pleading guilty changed 
over time; it was hardly used during the 1700s (0.2%), but had increased to more than 14% of 
charged cases from 1803 to 1871; note that it is also possible that the reporting of pleas in the 
Proceedings changed over time.  
   
4. The Impact of Abolishing Capital Punishment on Jury Decision-Making 
The main goal of this paper is to identify the effect of changes in punishment severity on jury 
decision-making, i.e. the likelihood of handing down a guilty verdict. In this section, we look 
at changes in punishment severity attributed to the offense specific abolition of capital 
punishment throughout the 1800s. Section 5 will consider changes in punishment due to the 
temporary halt and then permanent abolition of transportation.  
 
4.1. Graphical Evidence of the Treatment – Capital Punishment 
We begin by demonstrating the impact of abolishing capital punishment on sentences to death, 
transportation and prison for both the treatment and control groups (Panel A of Figure 6). The 
figure shows the share of each sentence in the ten years before and after the crime-specific year 
of reform as represented by the vertical line for the treatment group and the median year of 
reform (1833) for the control group, respectively. The share of death sentences is fairly steady 
in the treatment group (around 35%) in the years leading up to its abolition. In the first complete 
year after the reform, the share sentenced to death drops to zero. In the control group, the share 
of death sentences is just over 0% in both the years before and after the reform; it is not equal 
to zero as murder, which is always capital, is included in the control group. Panel B 
demonstrates the substitution from capital punishment to transportation for cases in the 
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treatment group in the year immediately after the reform. Despite a parallel pattern in the use 
of transportation prior to the reform in the treatment and control groups, this post-reform 
increase in transportation is only observed in the treatment group. Finally, as seen in Panel C 
of Figure 6, incarceration in both the treatment and control groups is decreasing slightly in the 
years leading up to the reforms, and increasing afterwards. This is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence on the timing of the rise of imprisonment as a preferred sanction. Though there is a 
difference in the level of imprisonment across treatment and control groups (both before and 
after the reform), the trends in the share incarcerated appear to be parallel throughout the time 
period.32  
 
4.2. Empirical Methodology – Capital Punishment 
Motivated by the variation across offenses in the timing of the abolition of capital punishment 
as well as a not insubstantial share of offenses for which the capital punishment status does not 
change, we adopt a difference-in-differences design to estimate the effect of the decrease in 
punishment severity occurring upon the abolition of capital punishment on the chance of 
conviction. Such a design helps to isolate the effect of capital punishment reforms from other 
changes occurring in the criminal justice system in the early and mid-1800s, including the 
introduction of a police force and defense counsel. We estimate the baseline specification, 
presented in equation (1), for the sample of observations from 1803 to 1871. 
 
(1) ܩ ௜ܸ௝௢௚௧ ൌ	∝ ൅	ߚଵ݊݋݊ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ௢௧ ൅ ߙ௢൅	ߙ௧൅	ߙ௠ ൅ 	 ௜ܺ௝௢௚௧ߜ ൅ ߳௜௝௢௚௧ 
 
The primary dependent variable is whether defendant i charged with offense category o (in 
offense group g) in year t is found guilty by jury j. Secondary outcomes include whether the 
jury convicts on a lesser charge and whether the jury makes a recommendation to mercy, each 
conditional on the guilty sample.33 The primary variable of interest, noncapital, is an indicator 
equal to one for offense-year combinations for which the offense is not capital eligible. That is, 
                                                 
32 In addition to the graphical evidence, we estimated the effect of the abolition of capital punishment on the 
probability of being sentenced to transportation or prison in a difference-in-differences regression framework 
analogous to estimating equation (1) and conditional on the convicted subsample. The results indeed confirm what 
can be seen in the graphs: There is a substantial and significant positive effect of the abolition of capital punishment 
both on the probability of being sentenced to transportation and to prison. We do not include the regression results 
in this paper; all results are available upon request. 
33 The original variable indicating the detailed verdict contains separate information on whether the verdict was 
guilty of a lesser offense, manslaughter (different from the genuine offense category manslaughter) or guilty for a 
theft under a certain value below the value originally charged. For our analysis, we construct a broad variable 
“guilty of lesser charge” by combining the three.  
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the treatment indicator noncapital turns on upon the abolition of capital punishment for 
treatment group offenses; for control group offenses, noncapital does not change over time and 
equals one (zero) for always (never) capital offenses. The offense-specific treatment years are 
reported in Table 2.34  
The baseline difference-in-differences specification includes: (i) offense fixed effects 
(ߙ௢ሻ to control for baseline differences in case characteristics and conviction rates across 
offenses, (ii) year fixed effects (ߙ௧) to capture other criminal justice reforms that affected all 
offenses such as the introduction of the police, (iii) month fixed effects (ߙ௠) to capture 
seasonality in criminal behavior and even jury behavior (given the absence of heat, it is certainly 
feasible that deliberations were different in the summer and winter),  and (iv) a vector of 
controls (X) including the defendant’s gender, the number of defendants, and the defendant’s 
criminal history in subsample analyses.  Standard errors are clustered on the specific offense 
type by year level.35 
 Intuitively, this design compares how conviction rates changed for the treatment group to 
that for the comparison group, the difference reflecting the effect of abolishing capital 
punishment. For 1 to represent the causal effect of the abolition of capital punishment on 
conviction rates, however, we clearly make the usual parallel trends assumption – namely that 
the change in conviction rates for treatment group offenses would have been the same as that 
for comparison group offenses in the absence of the death penalty reforms. A visual inspection 
of Figure 6 provides the first evidence that this assumption is satisfied; as discussed above, the 
pre-reform trends in sentencing (death, transportation, and prison) are comparable for the 
treatment and control groups prior to the reform year. Panel A of Figure 7 presents comparable 
graphs for the main outcome – the share of jury decisions resulting in conviction; visual 
inspection once again suggests parallel pre-reform trends. In fact, pre-reform conviction rates 
for both the treatment and control groups are fairly flat in the years leading up to the reforms. 
This figure also provides the first suggestive evidence that the abolition of capital punishment 
increased conviction rates for treatment offenses relative to control offenses. Panel B of Figure 
7 demonstrates parallel pre-reform trends in conviction rates by crime category, and suggests 
that the increase in conviction rates after the death penalty abolition is driven by violent offenses 
in particular.  
                                                 
34 Capital punishment for two treatment group offenses – sodomy and wounding – was abolished in stages; our 
baseline uses the first year of change as the reform year. 
35 We are less concerned about year to year autocorrelation given the quite flat conviction rates seen in the years 
leading up to the reforms, especially for property and violent offenses (this can be seen in Figure 7). The baseline 
results are robust, however, to clustering just by offense type rather than offense-year cell. 
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 A causal interpretation of the effect of abolishing capital punishment on conviction rates 
relies on two additional assumptions. First, although the abolition of capital punishment was 
doubtfully a ‘random’ policy given the criminal justice reform movement at the time, our 
identification strategy relies on the assumption that the timing of the offense-specific abolition 
was random. It took more than 40 years for capital punishment to be abolished for the whole of 
our treatment sample; there were no crime-specific movements determining the year that each 
offense was reformed.36 Jurors and defendants did not know which offense would be reformed 
next, nor did they know the year that the reform would occur. The absence of a change in 
conviction (Figure 7) or sentencing (Figure 6) behavior in the years immediately preceding the 
reforms supports the validity of this assumption.  
Second, our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the quality of evidence 
presented to the jury did not change after the reform; if it did, then it would be unclear whether 
jury decisions changed in response to changes in punishment severity or in the type of case. We 
will discuss this assumption in further detail in Section 4.5 and provide empirical tests of 
whether the quality of evidence changed. 
 
4.3. Capital Punishment: Main Results and Robustness Checks 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (1) for all offenses (with and without 
controls) and for the following broad offense categories: property, violent and sex, and fraud 
offenses. Panel A presents the results for the main dependent variable indicating whether the 
jury convicts the defendant. Including our full set of controls (column 2), we find that the 
abolition of capital punishment significantly increases the chance of conviction by 7.6 
percentage points (10.6% relevant to the mean). However, these estimates are quite 
heterogeneous across crime categories. Abolishing capital punishment increased the chance of 
conviction by 22 percentage points (37.0%) for violent crime and sex offense cases and 35 
percentage points (47.5%) for fraud offenses. In contrast, the effect for property crimes – by far 
the largest crime category – is much smaller (1.5 percentage points or 2%) and only significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
 Panels B and C of Table 4 present the results for our secondary outcomes for the sample 
of guilty verdicts – convictions of a lesser offence and recommendation to mercy, respectively. 
Conditional on being found guilty, the chance of conviction of a lesser charge on average 
                                                 
36 One exception that we are aware of is forgery. According to Hans and Vidmar (1986), English bankers requested 
the abolition of the death penalty for forgery. We present results overall and broad crime category. While the 
estimates are large for fraud offenses, they are just as large for violent and sex offenses.  
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decreases by more than 15 percentage points relative to a (pooled) mean of 0.07 while the 
chance of a jury recommendation for mercy on average decreases by six percentage points 
relative to a (pooled) mean of 0.11. These estimate are average effects; importantly, the average 
rates of conviction of a lesser offence and recommendation to mercy vary substantially between 
offenses.37 One prominent example is larceny: excluding larceny cases from the regression 
yields a 10 percentage point (instead of 15) decrease in convictions for a lesser offense relative 
to a mean of 0.133 (instead of 0.07). While the regressions take care of that by including offense 
specific fixed effects, the interpretation at the mean has to be done with caution.38 In terms of 
the sign and relative magnitudes of the coefficients across offenses, these findings are in line 
with economic intuition. Before the abolition of capital punishment, the jury had to find a means 
of lessening the sentence; as capital punishment is abolished, they no longer have to do this. 
When looking at the broad offense categories, we find that the lesser charge effect is completely 
driven by property crimes. For instance, the jury can convict an individual of theft of less than 
5 shillings to make the offense not eligible for capital punishment (for that point in history when 
5 shillings was the threshold). There are fewer violent and sex offenses with corresponding 
‘lesser’ offenses; one exception is murder and manslaughter.  The ‘recommendation to mercy’ 
results, however, are driven by violent and sex offenses as well as fraud. 
 To summarize the main results presented in Table 4, we find that the decrease in 
punishment severity arising from the abolition of capital punishment significantly increased the 
chance of conviction overall, and especially for violent and sex as well as fraud cases. This was 
accompanied by a large decrease in the chance of a recommendation for mercy in these crime 
categories - as mercy was no longer needed to spare someone death. Finally, for property 
offenses, there is a small increase in the chance of conviction and an accompanying reduction 
in the chance of mercy; however, the main channel through which property crime is affected is 
a reduction in the chance of being convicted of a lesser charge. 
 Table 5 presents a series of robustness and sensitivity analyses for conviction by the jury 
(Panel A) and conviction of a lesser offense (Panel B). For comparison purposes, the baseline 
result for all offenses is presented in column (1). Columns (2) and (3) demonstrate robustness 
                                                 
37 For example, the mean rate of conviction for a lesser offense is 0.03 for manslaughter but 0.54 for murder, while 
the mean rate of recommendation for mercy is 0.46 for manslaughter but only 0.11 for murder. Similarly, the 
mean rate of conviction for a lesser offense is 0.004 for stealing from master but 0.22 for burglary, while the mean 
rate of recommendation for mercy is 0.325 for stealing from master but only 0.08 for burglary. 
38 An alternative explanation for finding point estimates that exceed the mean is a misspecification of the linear 
model in the case of low probability outcomes. In order to rule that out, we run probit models for the secondary 
outcomes and find robust results: the marginal effects at the mean are still negative and statistically significant, 
and allow the same economic interpretation. As for the magnitudes, the nonlinear estimations yield smaller 
coefficients but suffer from the usual concern of biased results in nonlinear fixed effects estimation. 
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to controlling for offense group by year fixed effects and an offense group specific linear time 
trend. These very demanding specifications do not change the qualitative nature of the results, 
though the effect size decreases somewhat for the main outcome in Panel A. Columns (4) and 
(5) present the overall and property crime results when excluding larceny. Larceny is the largest 
crime category, but also the ‘messiest’: it was redefined a number of times during our sample 
period and furthermore is not a perfectly clean ‘control’ offense, as the laws did – theoretically 
- allow for death sentences at various points in history for thefts over a certain threshold. The 
results show that, if anything, excluding larceny increases our estimates of the effect of the 
abolition of capital punishment on the chance of conviction. Column (6) demonstrates the 
robustness of the results to excluding sodomy and wounding, which are the two offense 
categories for which capital punishment was abolished in stages. Finally, we demonstrate that 
restricting the sample to 1850 and earlier (i.e. before the abolition of transportation) and to after 
1820 yields the same general pattern of results with only a small decrease in the magnitude of 
the point (columns (7) and (8), respectively).39  
 
4.4. Capital Punishment: Heterogeneity Analysis 
Panel A of Table 6 turns to the question of whether the abolition of capital punishment has 
heterogeneous effects on the chance of conviction for different types of defendants. Two 
dimensions that we can consider are the defendant’s gender and criminal history.  Columns (1) 
to (3) consider whether the abolition of capital punishment had differential effects for male 
versus female defendants overall (column (1)) as well as for property and violent offenses 
(columns (2) and (3)). Sex offenses are excluded here given the lack of female sex offenders. 
Overall, the abolition of capital punishment increases the chance of conviction more than seven 
percentage points, with no differential effects by gender. When zooming in on violent crimes, 
however, we see that the abolition of capital punishment increases the chance of conviction by 
30 percentage points for females and just 18 percentage points for males; this suggests that 
juries were more reluctant to convict females than males prior to the abolition of the death 
penalty. Consistent with these findings, we also find that the abolition of capital punishment 
results in a significantly larger reduction in the chance of being convicted of a lesser charge for 
females than males (Panel B of Table 6). That is, prior to the reform, females were more likely 
to be treated favorably by the jury – they were less likely to be convicted and if convicted, they 
were more likely to be convicted of a lesser offense. 
                                                 
39 Additional specification checks (not shown) demonstrate robustness to using just the treatment group offenses 
and a more uniform control group (i.e. just those that are always capital or just those that are never capital).  
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Because criminal history is only recorded after 1832, column (4) begins by presenting our 
baseline specification for this restricted sample period; the abolition of capital punishment 
increases the chance of conviction by ten percentage points. Controlling for criminal history in 
column (5) has minimal impact on this finding, despite the fact that having a criminal history 
itself significantly increases the chance of conviction by 28 percentage points.  Finally, column 
(6) suggests that juries had less of a problem imposing a death sentence prior to the reform on 
individuals of known ‘bad character’, since the increase in conviction rates caused by the 
abolition of capital punishment is only observed for those individuals without a criminal history. 
Note, however, that this is suggestive and the coefficient on the interaction is somewhat 
imprecisely estimated.  
   
4.5. Threat to Identification: Changing Quality of Evidence 
The above empirical analysis estimates the effect of changing punishment severity on jury 
verdicts. The implicit identifying assumption is that it is only the expected punishment for the 
charged offense that changes from the jury’s perspective, while all other aspects of the case, 
and in particular the quality of evidence, are held constant. However, an alternative explanation 
for our finding that abolishing capital punishment increases conviction rates could be that it 
was accompanied by an increase in the quality of evidence presented to the jury. Clearly, it is 
possible that the abolition of capital punishment impacts the behavior of other agents in the 
criminal justice system, including potential criminals, defendants, police, and attorneys. But, 
does it do so in a way that affects (in particular, increases) the quality of evidence? We discuss 
each channel in turn and empirically test whether there is a change in the quality of evidence.40 
 The economic model of crime (Becker, 1968) predicts that abolishing the death penalty 
(i.e. decreasing expected punishment) should increase the number of crimes. The extensive 
empirical research regarding this question, however, does not find strong evidence that this is 
the case (Donohue and Wolfers, 2006). Perhaps most relevant in the current context is a study 
by Phillips (1980) of the deterrent effect of publicized London executions in the latter half of 
the 19th century. He finds that homicides are significantly lower in the two-weeks immediately 
after an execution (with larger effects for more publicized executions) but that there are no long-
term deterrent effects of executions on homicide. Panel A of Figure 8 presents the number of 
cases within the ‘treated’ offenses for each broad crime category seen in the Old Bailey 
                                                 
40 Note that we focus on an increase in the quality of evidence as a threat to identification. A decrease in the quality 
of evidence would result in a downward bias in the estimates meaning that our estimates would be a lower bound 
of the true effect. 
 24
Proceedings in the ten years before and after the respective reform years. Similar patterns are 
seen when considering crime rates normalized by linearly interpolated population estimates 
from the decennial census. A deterrent effect (in this case an increase in crime) is not apparent. 
It should be noted, however, that any observed change in the number of cases can reflect either 
a change in criminal behavior, or a change in the reporting behavior of the victim or witnesses.41 
Nevertheless, even if the crime rate did not change, it could still be the case that there was a 
change in the nature of the crime (e.g. how ‘sloppily’ it was committed) and the resulting quality 
of evidence (e.g. witnesses). We return to this shortly. 
 Alternatively, does the change in punishment severity affect policing behavior or the 
prosecutors’ decision to bring a case to trial? For this to be a concern to the validity of our 
analysis, however, it is not enough that the prosecutors decided to bring more cases to trial; it 
must also be that they were bringing cases forward with a differential standard of evidence in 
order to affect the jury’s decision to convict. Yet, punishment severity decreases with the 
abolition of capital punishment, which means that the stakes are decreasing. Thus, one may 
expect that prosecutors bring more cases with a lower quality of evidence to court rather than 
more cases with a higher quality of evidence. This would imply a downward bias in our baseline 
findings and that we estimate a lower bound of the true effect, but it would not undermine the 
validity of our results. 
 Finally, one could imagine that changes in expected punishment affect a defendant’s 
decision to plead guilty. If this affects the type of case faced by the jury, then this would raise 
similar concerns; however, the most likely scenario would be that defendants faced with the 
greatest chance of losing (i.e. the strongest evidence against them) would be more likely to 
plead, which would again lower the quality of evidence of the remaining cases that are faced 
by the jury. It is important to note, though, that pleas did not yet play a large role in the criminal 
justice system during this period: until 1836, just three percent of all cases are recorded as pleas; 
after 1836 (contemporaneous with the introduction of defense attorneys for felony indictments), 
pleading becomes a more common feature of the criminal justice system. Panel B of Figure 8 
demonstrates that the share of cases that are pled are trending up in the years surrounding the 
abolition of capital punishment, and that this occurs for both the treatment (centered on 
treatment year) and control offenses (again centered on 1833). As a further robustness check 
that our results are not driven by a change in case composition due to a change in plea behavior, 
we re-estimate our baseline specification when including all cases in which a defendant pled 
                                                 
41 In addition, the Proceedings are likely to be a noisy measure of crime at this time, given changing catchment 
areas and the presence of other courts. 
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guilty and assume these cases would have resulted in a guilty verdict by the jury (see column 
(9) of Table 5). Although this decreases the magnitude of our estimated effect, we still find that 
the abolition of capital punishment significantly increases conviction rates.  
 To more directly assess the bottom line concern presented in this section – namely that 
there might be an increase in the quality of evidence with the abolition of capital punishment – 
we use the Old Bailey online search function to create proxies for the quality of evidence. 
Specifically, we conduct keyword searches for witness, police, and evidence by year and offense 
category, and then normalize by the number of charges in that year (i.e. we look at the hit rate).42 
Table 7 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using the resulting panel of offense 
category (26 offenses) by year data, including offense and year fixed effects. When looking at 
all offenses, there is a significant reduction in the hit rate for the keywords ‘evidence’ and 
‘witness’ after the abolition of capital punishment, and a marginally significant reduction in hits 
on ‘police’. Similar patterns – though less significant – are seen when looking at violent and 
sex offenses or property offenses. Thus, we find that, if anything, there is a decrease in the 
quality of evidence, but certainly not an increase in the quality of evidence.  
 
5. The Impact of Halting and Abolishing Transportation on Jury Decision-Making  
5.1. The American Revolution and Temporary Halt of Transportation  
This section assesses the impact of the temporary halt of transportation during and following 
the American Revolution on conviction rates. We begin by graphically assessing how 
punishment changed during the war.  The vertical lines in Figure 9 correspond to the years 1776 
when transportation was first suspended due to the Revolution, 1781 when judges began issuing 
transportation sentences despite the lack of a penal colony, and 1787 when a new penal colony 
in Australia was officially established. Conditioning on the sample of guilty cases, Panel A 
presents the share of sentences to transportation, death, and prison for the transportation eligible 
offenses (i.e. treated offenses as specified in Table 2). Almost 75% of sentences in each year 
leading up to the war were sentenced to transportation and 0% in the years 1776 to 1781. The 
share of sentences to transportation began to increase again in 1781, until the pre-war levels 
were nearly reached in 1787. Panel A also demonstrates that imprisonment was the primary 
substitute for transportation, as the share of prison sentences rose from around 0% to almost 
                                                 
42 Specifically, the three searches include the following terms: (i) evidence; (ii) witness(es); and (iii) policeman, 
police, constable, watchman, watch-man, watchmen, runner, thief taker, bobby, bobbies, peeler, peelers. 
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50% during the war while the share of death sentences only rose by 5-10 percentage points. 
After the war, imprisonment rates decreased again, though not back to zero.  
The fact that in some cases transportation was substituted by capital punishment – which 
is clearly a harsher punishment than incarceration – makes it hard to say whether punishment 
severity (i.e. the jury’s expectation regarding punishment) actually increased or decreased. Yet, 
it becomes clearer (at least for a subset of offenses) upon decomposing the treatment offenses 
into those that were and those that were not capital eligible. For non-capital offenses (larceny 
and perjury) the temporary halt of transportation sharply decreased expected punishment with 
an increase in prison sentences, if one assumes that a sentence to prison (despite the horrible 
prison conditions) was perceived as better than transportation to the Americas. For capital 
offenses, however, both death and imprisonment were substitutes, leaving the change in 
expected punishment ambiguous (see Panels B and C of Figure 9).  
Our baseline specification to estimate the effect of the unexpected change in punishment 
severity upon the temporary halt of transportation in 1776 is presented in equation (2). Since, 
as seen in Table 2, we lack a sufficiently large control group (i.e. offenses not eligible for 
transportation at this time), we use a simple reduced-form pre-post design. A distinguishing 
feature of this experiment is that the change in punishment severity is driven by a shock – the 
war – that is exogenous to the justice system. The flip side is that this reduced form experiment 
captures not just the first order effect of the American Revolution on transportation, which we 
already demonstrated to be both sharp and large, but also any other channels through which the 
war may affect conviction rates.43 One may be particularly concerned about the immediate 
aftermath of the war, when the release of military personnel shocked the skilled and unskilled 
labor markets and when there was tremendous unrest in London following the Gordon Riots in 
1780. Thus, our baseline specification focuses on the years 1772 to 1779, i.e. the four years 
surrounding the start of the war and prior to the riots.   
 
(2) ࡳࢂ࢏࢐࢕࢚ࢉࢇ࢖,࢔࢕࢔ࢉࢇ࢖ ൌ	∝ ൅ࢼ૚ࡼ࢘ࢋ૚ૠૠ૟࢚ ൅ ࢻ࢕ ൅ ࢻ࢓ ൅ ࢻ࢐࢛ࢊࢍࢋ ൅ 	ࢄ࢏࢐࢕࢚ࢾ ൅ ࣕ࢏࢐࢕࢚  
 
The dependent variable is whether the jury returned a guilty verdict (GV) for defendant i facing 
jury j charged with offense category o in year t. The primary variable of interest, Pre1776, is a 
dummy indicating the four years prior to the war; that is, it is an indicator for the period during 
                                                 
43 See King (2000) for a discussion of the relationship between wars and crime during the 1700s, including the use 
of the military instead of sanctions and the impact of service on post-service crime, potentially attributable to poor 
labor market opportunities. 
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which transportation existed. Defining the specification with the omitted time period having the 
changed expected punishment (no transportation) allows us to expand the same specification to 
assess the impact of re-introducing transportation. All specifications again control for offense 
and month fixed effects; in this case, more detailed data also allow us to control for judge fixed 
effects. We control for a vector X of case specific characteristics, including defendant gender, 
number of defendants, and whether the jury (and therefore case) was a London jury (case). The 
latter is a particularly important control during this time period as the Middlesex judges had 
limited access to the hulks as a potential sentence compared to the London judges (Hitchcock 
and Shoemaker, 2015). 44  
 A number of additional points are worth making about our choice of baseline 
specification. First, we do not include time trends given that sentencing patterns (share 
transported and share sentenced to death) were relatively constant in the years leading up to the 
war. Second, we focus on just the pre-war period. We believe this to be the cleanest natural 
experiment, because (i) in contrast to its reinstatement, the halt of transportation was 
unexpected, (ii) our reduced form framework would make it difficult to disentangle the effect 
of reintroducing transportation from the general discontent with the criminal justice system in 
part due to the overcrowded prisons and hulks, and (iii) it is difficult to characterize what 
happened to expected punishment severity in the post-war period, as transportation was re-
instated in name only until 1786.  Finally, as denoted in the superscript in equation (2), much 
of our empirical analysis divides the transportation eligible offenses into two sub-treatment 
groups, capital versus non-capital eligible offenses, and emphasizes the latter. As demonstrated 
above, halting transportation differentially affects punishment severity for these two groups. 
For the non-capital offenses, the halt of transportation unambiguously decreases punishment 
severity, as the only substitute is prison/hulks, whereas the impact on punishment severity is 
less clear for capital offenses. 
 The results of estimating equation (2) are presented in Table 8. When considering all 
transportation eligible cases and including the full set of controls, as shown in column (2), we 
find that defendants are about 3 percentage points less likely to be convicted (5.5% relative to 
the mean conviction rate of 56.4%) in the pre-war period when transportation is a possible 
sentence; without controlling for the jurisdiction, we find a slightly negative, but insignificant 
effect. Columns (3) and (4) decompose these offenses into those that are non-capital and capital, 
respectively. The overall effect is, in fact, being driven by the non-capital cases, for which 
                                                 
44 Note that judge fixed effects can be included since we observe 30 judges who try cases in multiple periods; jury 
fixed effects on other hand cannot be included given that each jury is only observed in one period. 
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punishment severity is unequivocally higher before the halt of transportation; these defendants 
were almost five percentage points less likely to be convicted (8% relative to the mean) when 
transportation was on the table compared to the war period. No effect, however, is seen for 
capital offenses. Columns (5) and (6) look separately at London and Middlesex cases; the effect 
of transportation on verdicts in non-capital cases is larger in Middlesex (about 6 percentage 
points) compared to London (about 2 percentage points).  Column (7) includes an offense group 
specific linear time trend; though the coefficient decreases somewhat (and precision is lost), the 
same qualitative results are seen. Finally, column (8) tests whether the same pattern of results 
is seen upon the reintroduction of transportation. To do this, we expand the sample to include 
years through to 1789 (we stop here as the data is missing between 1790 and 1792) and include 
dummy variables for two additional periods: 1780-1786, which includes the Gordon Riots, its 
aftermath, and the presence of transportation in name only, and post1786 when a new Australian 
penal colony is established. We focus on the latter period for two reasons: (i) to avoid 
confounding our estimates with the other channels through which the immediate aftermath of 
the war may affect crime and conviction rates and (ii) because punishment severity has 
unambiguously changed again, whereas it is unclear what people perceived punishment to be 
during the 1780-1786 period, given the lack of a penal colony. We find that reinstating 
transportation decreases the chance of conviction by about 2.5 percentage points, though this 
effect is not significantly different from zero.45 
 
5.2. The Abolition of Transportation in 1853 
Finally, we consider the impact of abolishing transportation in 1853. While there was a second 
Penal Servitude Act in 1857, we focus on the impact of the first Penal Servitude Act in 1853 
that abolished transportation for almost all cases (see Figure 2) and a sample period from 1848 
to 1857. We choose these years to limit the chance of confounding the effect of the abolition of 
transportation with anything else happening contemporaneously – namely the recent abolition 
of capital punishment in the 1830s and an 1858 jury reform that allowed juries food, drink and 
heat during deliberations. 
                                                 
45 The risk of confounding the causal estimates with the effects of the immediate aftermath of the war is arguably 
larger when we estimate the effects on the secondary outcomes (lesser charge, recommendation for mercy), which 
allow for more discretion. When we estimate these effects, we find that the probability of being charged of a lesser 
offense for capital offenses in London (but neither for capital offenses in Middlesex nor for non-capital offenses) 
is higher in the pre-war period. We do not find any effect on recommendations for mercy. One possible explanation 
is that the lack of a substitute punishment for capital cases led to fewer verdicts of a lesser offense. The results are 
not reported in the paper but available upon request.    
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We again begin with graphical evidence of the treatment. The vertical line in Figure 10 
corresponds to the year 1853, the year in which the first and main law abolishing transportation 
was passed. The share of sentences to transportation decreased from 20-25% to almost 0% with 
the first reform in 1853, with a corresponding substitution from transportation to imprisonment. 
There is thus a decrease in expected punishment, but it should be noted that the overall level of 
punishment severity is already much lower in the 1850s than during the American Revolution. 
We use a similar pre-post research design as in the analysis of the halt of transportation 
to study the reduction in punishment severity upon the abolition of transportation. Since the 
sharpest decrease in transportation sentences occurred after the first reform, our baseline 
empirical specification, presented in equation (3), includes a dummy for whether the trial was 
in 1853 or later. 
 
(3) ࡳࢂ࢏࢐࢕࢚ ൌ	∝ ൅ࢼ૚ࡼ࢕࢙࢚૚ૡ૞૛࢚ ൅ ࢻ࢕ ൅ ࢻ࢓ ൅ 	ࢄ࢏࢐࢕࢚ࢾ ൅ ࢟ࢋࢇ࢚࢘ ൅ ࣕ࢏࢐࢕࢚  
 
Punishment severity was trending down in the years leading up to the reform (easiest to see in 
Figure 2), with the gradual abolition of capital punishment and growth of the prison system. 
Thus, our baseline empirical specification includes a linear time trend (year) in addition to the 
usual controls (offense fixed effects, month fixed effects, defendant gender, number of 
defendants, and in this case, criminal history). During this time period, we no longer observe 
judge and jury characteristics. Thus, our baseline analysis estimates equation (3) for the 
treatment group offense categories as listed in Table 2. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 9 present 
the results; using the full set of controls as shown in column (3), the decrease in punishment 
severity does not significantly affect conviction rates. Note that when we do not include a linear 
annual trend, we find significant negative coefficients; however, these appear to reflect a 
general trend rather than the impact of the abolition of transportation, as they are absorbed once 
we include the linear trend variable.  
 Finally, in an attempt to control for changes in other factors that affect conviction rates, 
we break the set of offenses into two groups: those which had relatively high and low 
transportation shares prior to the abolition of transportation. We calculate the share of 
transportation sentences in the years just before the reform and define the high transportation 
share group as offenses with a more than 25% share of transportation sentences.46 We then 
                                                 
46 Note that we use different windows in order to calculate the share of transportation sentences and to define the 
treatment. Our treatment definition is robust to that except for the two offenses murder and receiving. Hence, we 
exclude these two offenses from the difference-in-differences analysis. 
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estimate a difference-in-differences specification with the high share transportation offenses as 
the treatment group, based on the notion that the change in punishment severity upon the 
abolition of transportation is larger for these offenses. The corresponding results are presented 
in columns (4) and (5) of Table 9; we find no evidence that the decrease in punishment severity 
results in an increase in conviction rates in the high compared to the low transportation share 
offenses, confirming the results from the pre-post design.      
Why does the decrease in punishment severity occurring with the abolition of transportation 
have no impact on conviction rates? One potential explanation is that the extent to which 
changes in punishment severity affect jury behavior depends on the size of the change: the 
largest change in punishment clearly occurred with the abolition of capital punishment. 
Likewise, the temporary halt of transportation during the war likely represents a larger reduction 
in sanction severity than the final abolition of transportation, since transportation was so much 
more common at the time of the first experiment than later. An additional explanation may be 
that the abolition of transportation had no effect on conviction rates because it came so soon 
after the abolition of capital punishment. That is, in the years prior to 1853, jurors had already 
experienced a large decrease in expected punishment, and reacted by substantially increasing 
conviction rates, leaving less room for future such increases. Finally, it may be that changes in 
expected punishment only affect jury behavior if they surpass some threshold – i.e. a level of 
punishment that a juror’s moral code prevents them from imposing.47 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Using three natural experiments from English history, this paper studies how changes in 
punishment severity affect jury decision-making. We find that the decrease in punishment 
severity resulting from the abolition of the death penalty had a large and significant impact on 
jury behavior, generally leading to the jury being ‘harsher’. Similarly, the unexpected decrease 
in punishment severity at the time of the American Revolution resulted in a significant increase 
in convictions, albeit one that is smaller than that in the death penalty context.  Finally, the 
abolition of transportation in the 1850s, which followed the abolition of the death penalty, had 
no impact on conviction rates.  
                                                 
47 Similar to the death penalty analysis, we also estimated the effects on convictions separately by crime type as 
well as the effects on the secondary outcomes (charged of lesser offense, recommendation for mercy). We do not 
find any heterogeneity across crime types neither do we find significant effects for the secondary outcomes. The 
results are not reported in the paper but available upon request.    
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 Despite the historical context, these findings have important potential implications to 
today’s criminal justice system. First, we show that punishment severity does affect jury 
behavior, especially in the typically highly controversial capital cases. An unexpected 
consequence of abolishing the death penalty may be an increase in convictions. Conversely, 
that implies lower conviction rates when the death penalty is in place. This is one potential 
explanation for the finding in much of the recent literature that there is no or only little evidence 
of a deterrence effect of capital punishment (whether because there is no deterrence effect or a 
lack of statistical power to detect it).48 That is, our results are consistent with an explanation 
that a potential deterrence effect of capital punishment is (at least to some extent) offset by an 
inverse deterrence effect of lower conviction rates, which decrease the expected punishment for 
the offender. 
Second, our heterogeneity analyses indicate that, at least for certain crime categories, 
juries were differentially affected by the reforms depending on the defendant’s gender and 
criminal history. This (perhaps unintentional) unequal application of justice raises questions 
about the fairness of the criminal justice system with respect to observable characteristics of 
the defendant. Such questions are clearly still topical today, especially in the context of 
defendant and victim race, and continue to be discussed in the literature.49 Third, although juries 
in today’s criminal justice system decide only a small share of cases, this research certainly 
raises the question of whether punishment severity impacts the behavior of other agents in the 
criminal justice system, such as judges. Finally, our findings may be relevant in the evaluations 
of many other contexts in which an individual’s actions are potentially affected by the expected 
consequences of his actions, such as reporting cheating students or reporting households to 
welfare agencies.  
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Figure 1. Share of capital eligible offenses (1715-1900) 
 
 
NOTE- The figure shows the share of offense categories in the sample that are eligible for capital punishment 
between 1715 and 1900. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
 36
Figure 2. Share of sentences - Death, transportation and prison (1715-1900) 
 
 
NOTE- The figure shows the share of convicted cases that result in a death penalty (black line), penal transportation 
(dark grey line) and prison (light grey line) in the sample between 1715 and 1900. SOURCE- The Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 3. London - Population growth (1801-1911) 
 
NOTE- The figure shows the population in Inner London (dotted), Outer London (dashed) and Greater London 
(solid line) as obtained from the decennial census data between 1801 and 1911. SOURCE- Historic census UK. 
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Figure 4. Number of cases by broad offense category, analysis sample 
 
 
NOTE- The figure shows the annual number of cases in the sample (tried at the Old Bailey) between 1715 and 
1900 and by broad offense category (property offenses, violent offenses, sex offenses and fraud offenses). 
SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 5. Identifying the time of treatment – Abolition of capital punishment 
Panel A – Always capital punishment eligible 
 
Panel B – Never capital punishment eligible 
 
Panel C – Change in capital punishment eligibility 
 
NOTE- The figure shows the annual share of convicted cases in the sample that were sentenced to death for 
murder (Panel A, always capital punishable), bigamy (Panel B, never capital punishable) and robbery (Panel C, 
change in capital punishment eligibility). The dashed vertical red lines mark the years that were affected by 
changes in penal transportation (American Revolution and abolition of transportation); the solid red line in 
Panel C marks the year of treatment, i.e. the first year in which the observed share of capital punishment is 
equal to zero. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 6. Sentencing and the abolition of capital punishment 
Panel A – Treatment and control group, death penalty 
 
Panel B – Treatment and control group, transportation 
 
Panel C – Treatment and control group, prison 
 
NOTE- The figure shows the annual share of convicted cases in the treatment (black) and control (grey) group 
that were sentenced to death (Panel A), transportation (Panel B) or prison (Panel C) in the 10 years before and 
after the assigned treatment year. The vertical line marks the offense specific year of abolition of capital 
punishment for offenses in the treatment group and the median year of abolition of capital punishment (1833) 
for the control group. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 7. Conviction rates and the abolition of capital punishment  
Panel A – Treatment and control group, all offenses 
 
Panel B – Treatment and control group, property and violent offenses 
 
NOTE- The figure shows the annual share of guilty verdicts (cases convicted by jury) in the treatment (black) and 
control (grey) group for all offenses in the sample (Panel A) and separately for property and violent offenses (Panel 
B) in the 10 years before and after the assigned treatment year and relative to all cases tried by jury. The vertical 
line marks the offense specific year of abolition of capital punishment for offenses in the treatment group and the 
median year of abolition of capital punishment (1833) for the control group. SOURCE- The Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 8. Changes in behavior and the abolition of capital punishment 
Panel A - Changes in criminal behavior 
 
Panel B - Changes in plea behavior 
 
NOTE- Panel A shows the annual number of cases in the sample tried at the Old Bailey in the treatment group for 
violent and sex offenses (solid line), property offenses (dashed) and fraud offenses (dotted) in the 10 years before 
and after the assigned treatment year. Panel B shows the share of pleaded cases in the treatment (black) and control 
(grey) group. The vertical line marks the offense specific year of abolition of capital punishment for offenses in 
the treatment group and the median year of abolition of capital punishment (1833) for the control group. SOURCE- 
The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 9. Sentencing and the American Revolution 
Panel A - All transportation eligible offenses 
 
Panel B - Non-capital transportation eligible offenses 
 
Panel C - Capital transportation eligible offenses 
 
 
NOTE- Panel A shows the annual share of all convicted cases in the treatment group that were sentenced to 
transportation (solid line), death (dashed) or prison (dotted) between 1772 and 1789. Panel B shows the equivalent 
numbers for non-capital eligible offenses, Panel C for capital eligible offenses. The vertical lines mark the halt of 
transportation in 1776, the reinstatement in transportation by name only in 1781 and the actual start of 
transportation to Australia in 1787. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Figure 10. Sentencing and the abolition of transportation 
 
NOTE- The figure shows the annual share of convicted cases in the treatment group that were sentenced to 
transportation (solid line), death (dashed) or prison (dotted) between 1848 and 1857. The vertical line marks the 
abolition of transportation in 1853. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Table 1. Offense categories 
Category Subcategory Offenses Combined Offenses 
Property 
Theft 
Animal theft, mail, stealing from master, theft from 
place, shoplifting 
Larceny: Grand larceny 
(more than 1 shilling), 
petty larceny (less than 
one shilling), simple 
larceny, pocket picking 
Excluded from sample: 
 Game law offense 
Other 
Arson, burglary, house breaking, receiving   
Excluded from sample:  
Breaking into place 
Violent 
Killing 
Manslaughter, murder   
Excluded from sample:  
Infanticide, petty treason 
Other 
Assault, wounding Robbery: Highway 
robbery, robbery Excluded from sample:  
Kidnapping, riot 
Sex 
Violent 
Rape Sexual assault: Assault 
with intent, indecent 
assault 
Other Excluded from sample:  
Keeping a brothel 
Sodomy: Assault with 
sodomitical intent, 
sodomy 
Fraud Fraud 
Coining offenses, embezzlement, forgery, fraud   
Excluded from sample:  
Treason 
Other Other 
Bigamy, libel, perjury, perverting justice   
Excluded from sample:  
Barratry, concealing a birth, conspiracy, extortion, 
habitual criminal, illegal abortion, piracy, religious 
offenses, return from transportation, seditious libel, 
seditious words, seducing allegiance, tax offenses, 
threatening behavior, vagabond, bankruptcy 
NOTE- The table shows the offense categories included and excluded from the analysis sample. Where applicable, 
we combine offense categories into one bigger category (larceny, robbery, sexual assault, sodomy).  
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Table 2. Treatment/control offenses and treatment year for each experiment 
   Capital Punishment Transportation (I) Transportation (II) 
 Offence specific laws American Revolution Penal Servitude Acts 
 +/-10 years around treatment year 1772 - 1789 1848 - 1857 
Offense Treatment Year #Cases Treatment #Cases Treatment #Cases 
Property offenses         
Animal theft T 1832 1168 T 435 T 248 
Arson T 1856 111 D 19 D 46 
Burglary T 1837 1081 T 1323 T 880 
Housebreaking T 1833 1396 T 164 T 497 
Larceny C (never) Median 32278 T 8181 T 4673 
Mail T 1834 74 D 5 T 127 
Receiving T 1837 3567 T 686 T 740 
Shoplifting T 1820 763 T 441 T 69 
Stealing from 
master C (never) Median 4696 D 0 T 2223 
Theft from place T 1832 3706 T 1537 T 1072 
Violent and sex offenses         
Assault C (never) Median 185 D 5 C 176 
Manslaughter C (never) Median 295 C 14 T 213 
Murder C (always) Median 222 C 161 T 108 
Robbery T 1837 859 T 1529 T 481 
Rape T 1841 228 C 63 T 116 
Sexual assault D - 0 D 0 C 80 
Sodomy T 1832 (1860) 81 C 15 D 89 
Wounding T 1837 (1861) 825 C 35 D 710 
Fraud offenses         
Coining offenses T 1832 893 C 337 T 2138 
Embezzlement C (never) Median 1650 D 3 T 719 
Forgery T 1832 581 C 155 T 694 
Fraud T 1813 160 T 151 T 634 
Other offenses         
Bigamy C (never) Median 225 D 20 T 134 
Libel C (never) Median 23 D 1 C 35 
Perjury C (never) Median 102 T 100 D 142 
Perverting justice T 1831 83 T 77 T 42 
 
Total 26 
Median: 
1833 
55 252 26 15 457 26 17 086 
Treatment 16 15 576 11 14 624 19 15 808 
Control 9 39 676 7 780 3 291 
Dropped 1 0 8 53 4 987 
NOTE- The table shows the classification of offenses into treatment (T) and control (C) groups, the assigned 
treatment year as well as the number of observations for each of the analyzed natural experiments. D indicates 
offenses that were dropped for a given ‘experiment’. For control group offenses, we assign the year of ‘treatment’ 
as the median year of observed reforms (1833). SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online, various sources 
as specified in the text (laws) and own calculations. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
 
All Capital Punishment  Transportation  
 
 Treatment Control American Revolution 
Penal 
Servitude Acts 
Variable  1803 - 1871 1772  -1789 1848 - 1857 
 
Sample 
Number of observations (N) 206,733 49,285 76,673 14,624 15,808 
Number of sessions (N) 1 748 703 703 153 120 
Avg. number of cases per session 150.0 172.8 211.1 97.64 149.1 
Avg. number of defendants per case 1.483 1.762 1.265 1.512 1.361 
 
Offenses  
Property off. (0/1) 0.729 0.577 0.893 0.873 0.666 
Violent off. (0/1) 0.101 0.137 0.032 0.105 0.051 
Sex off. (0/1) 0.018 0.020 0.006  0.007 
Fraud off. (0/1) 0.133 0.262 0.051 0.010 0.265 
Other off. (0/1) 0.020 0.005 0.018 0.012 0.011 
 
Defendants  
Avg. age 27.57 27.10 26.40 16.79 26.61 
Aged 18 to 21  (0/1) 0.240 0.258 0.254 0.131 0.263 
Aged under 18 (0/1) 0.150 0.129 0.200 0.779 0.140 
Age missing (0/1) 0.376 0.237 0.230 0.985 0.236 
Age missing, guilty cases (0/1) 0.161 0.053 0.045 0.569 0.068 
Age missing, non-guilty cases (0/1) 0.214 0.183 0.185 0.410 0.167 
Male (0/1) 0.786 0.813 0.781 0.728 0.812 
Any known criminal history,  
   from 1832 (0/1) 0.111 0.106 0.101  0.098 
 
Juries and judges  
Avg. number of juries per session 3.072   3.245  
London jury  (0/1) 0.243   0.277  
Number of judges 104   30  
 
Pleads and Verdicts 
Pleaded guilty (0/1) 0.136 0.140 0.148 0.002 0.316 
Guilty by jury or plea (0/1) 0.719 0.726 0.779 0.584 0.793 
Guilty by jury (0/1) 0.675 0.681 0.741 0.583 0.697 
Guilty of lesser offense (0/1) 0.047 0.085 0.009 0.052 0.026 
Recommended for mercy (0/1) 0.061 0.071 0.093 0.030 0.081 
Not guilty by jury (0/1) 0.324 0.318 0.259 0.416 0.302 
 
Sentences conditional on guilty by jury or plea 
Capital punishment (0/1) 0.069 0.123 0.004 0.187 0.002 
Transportation (0/1) 0.294 0.259 0.308 0.381 0.156 
Imprisonment (0/1) 0.522 0.564 0.578 0.186 0.808 
Corporal punishment (0/1) 0.042 0.011 0.038 0.179 0.007 
Miscellaneous punishment (0/1) 0.045 0.020 0.042 0.055 0.001 
No punishment (0/1) 0.030 0.022 0.030 0.012 0.026 
NOTE- The table shows summary statistics for the variables in the analysis sample for each of the analysis periods. 
Where not otherwise specified, the mean of the variable is shown. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online 
and own calculations. 
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Table 4. Baseline results - Abolition of capital punishment and jury decisions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Offense: All All Property Violent and sex Fraud 
            
Panel A. Guilty by jury verdict (0/1) 
noncapital (0/1) 0.0917*** 0.0764*** 0.0153* 0.220*** 0.345*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0091) (0.0080) (0.0285) (0.0515) 
      
Mean 0.720 0.721 0.737 0.595 0.726 
Observations 104,910 104,670 83,990 10,017 9,375 
Number of clusters 1535 1535 623 475 207 
R-squared 0.053 0.067 0.051 0.107 0.138 
      
Panel B. Guilty of lesser offence conditional on guilty by jury verdict (0/1), broad definition 
noncapital (0/1) -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.203*** 0.0214 0.0017 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0397) (0.0133) 
      
Mean 0.069 0.069 0.053 0.280 0.032 
Observations 75,571 75,422 61,919 5,961 6,806 
Number of clusters 1423 1423 595 434 205 
R-squared 0.256 0.258 0.239 0.221 0.140 
Panel C. Recommended for mercy conditional on guilty by jury verdict (0/1) 
noncapital (0/1) -0.0590*** -0.0602*** -0.0363*** -0.235*** -0.150*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0273) (0.0358) 
      
Mean 0.112 0.112 0.117 0.103 0.076 
Observations 75,571 75,422 61,919 5,961 6,806 
Number of clusters 1423 1423 595 434 205 
R-squared 0.062 0.066 0.065 0.142 0.054 
      
Offense f.e. yes yes yes yes yes 
Year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes 
Month f.e. yes yes yes yes yes 
Control var. no yes yes yes yes 
NOTE- The table shows the results for the baseline regressions corresponding to estimating equation (1). The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating a guilty jury verdict (Panel A), a verdict guilty of a lesser 
offense (Panel B) and a recommendation for mercy (Panel C). Standard errors clustered on year x offense are 
shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Table 5. Robustness Analyses – Abolition of capital punishment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Offense: All All All All Property All All All All 
Specification: Baseline Off.group x 
year f.e. 
Off.group x 
annual 
trend 
Exclude 
larceny 
Exclude 
larceny 
Exclude 
sodomy and 
wounding 
Before 
1850 
After 1820, 
before 1850 
Plea = 
guilty 
Panel A. Guilty by jury verdict (0/1) 
noncapital (0/1) 0.0764*** 0.0344*** 0.0552*** 0.0865*** 0.0431*** 0.0621*** 0.0607*** 0.0554*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0079) (0.0085) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0089) (0.0098) (0.0111) (0.0080) 
          
Mean 0.721 0.721 0.721 0.673 0.686 0.722 0.728 0.739 0.759 
Observations 104,670 104,670 104,670 52,535 31,855 101,909 86,637 66,679 121,410 
Cluster 1535 1535 1535 1466 554 1405 1030 693 1548 
R-squared 0.067 0.076 0.070 0.082 0.064 0.067 0.072 0.068 0.064 
                  
Panel B. Guilty of lesser offence conditional on guilty by jury verdict (0/1), broad definition 
noncapital (0/1) -0.153*** -0.186*** -0.164*** -0.104*** -0.135*** -0.167*** -0.146*** -0.0986***  
 (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0103) (0.0123) (0.0125)  
          
Mean 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.139 0.138 0.058 0.066 0.048  
Observations 75,422 75,422 75,422 35,356 21,853 73,537 63,101 49,287  
Cluster 1423 1423 1423 1354 526 1310 928 642  
R-squared 0.258 0.276 0.264 0.228 0.212 0.222 0.257 0.236  
Offense f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Month f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control var. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
NOTE- The table shows the results for the robustness analysis corresponding to estimating equation (1) and as specified. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating 
a guilty jury verdict (Panel A) and a verdict guilty of a lesser offense (Panel B). Standard errors clustered on year x offense are shown in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations.  
 51
Table 6. Heterogeneity analyses – Abolition of capital punishment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Offense: All Property Violent All All All 
Specification: Gender  Criminal history 
  Interaction Interaction Interaction Baseline 
after 1832 
Control 
variable 
Interaction 
 
Panel A. Guilty by jury verdict (0/1) 
noncapital (0/1) 0.0750*** 0.0177 0.305*** 0.100*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0414) (0.0223) (0.0254) (0.0255) 
male defendant (0/1) 0.0663*** 0.0773*** 0.124***    
 (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.0311)    
noncapital x male defendant 0.0017 -0.0031 -0.119***    
 (0.0116) (0.0129) (0.0349)    
criminal history (0/1)     0.277*** 0.388*** 
     (0.00867) (0.0716) 
noncapital x criminal history      -0.112 
      (0.0722)        
Mean 0.721 0.737 0.609 0.727 0.724 0.724 
Observations 104,670 83,990 8,702 59,544 57,134 57,134 
Cluster 1535 623 310 949 940 940 
R-squared 0.067 0.051 0.111 0.069 0.105 0.105 
 
Panel B. Guilty of lesser offence conditional on guilty by jury verdict (0/1), broad definition 
noncapital (0/1) -0.236*** -0.295*** -0.0646 -0.0622*** -0.0591*** -0.0564*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0173) (0.0603) (0.0234) (0.0213) (0.0210) 
male defendant (0/1) -0.112*** -0.122*** -0.138***    
 (0.0132) (0.0152) (0.0435)    
noncapital x male defendant 0.102*** 0.113*** 0.108**    
 (0.0135) (0.0154) (0.0473)    
criminal history (0/1)     -0.0115*** 0.0463 
     (0.00282) (0.0608) 
noncapital x criminal history      -0.0583 
      (0.0611) 
       
Mean 0.069 0.053 0.282 0.053 0.054 0.054 
Observations 75,422 61,919 5,299 43,259 41,344 41,344 
Cluster 1423 595 295 919 910 910 
R-squared 0.261 0.244 0.248 0.283 0.289 0.289 
Offense f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Month f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control var. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
NOTE- The table shows the results for the heterogeneity analysis (by criminal history and gender) corresponding 
to estimating equation (1). The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating a guilty jury verdict (Panel A) 
and a verdict guilty of a lesser offense (Panel B). Standard errors clustered on year x offense are shown in 
parentheses below the estimated coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Table 7. Identification test - Abolition of capital punishment and quality of evidence 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Offense: All Violent and sex Property 
    
Dependent variable: Hit rate (key words) 
    
Panel A. 'Evidence' 
noncapital (0/1) -0.104*** -0.186*** -0.0369 
 (0.0182) (0.0253) (0.032) 
    
Observations 1444 438 557 
R-squared 0.386 0.621 0.303 
    
Panel B. 'Police' 
noncapital (0/1) -0.0375* -0.0548 0.0137 
  (0.0218) (0.0344) (0.0342) 
     
Observations 1444 438 557 
R-squared 0.569 0.823 0.42 
        
Panel C. 'Witness' 
noncapital (0/1) -0.0688*** -0.059 -0.0436 
  (0.0217) (0.0363) (0.0444) 
Observations 1444 438 557 
R-squared 0.37 0.597 0.406 
        
Offense f.e. yes yes yes 
Year f.e. yes yes yes 
NOTE- The table shows the results for the identification test of estimating equation (1). The dependent variable is 
the hit rate corresponding to the key words evidence (Panel A), police (Panel B) and Witness (Panel C) – see the 
text for further details on the construction of the variable. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
the estimated coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Table 8. Baseline results – American Revolution, halt of transportation and convictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Offense: All All Non-capital Capital Non-capital Non-capital Non-capital Non-capital 
Jurisdiction: All cases London Middlesex All cases 
         
pre1776 (0/1) -0.0040 -0.0308** -0.0504*** -0.0046 -0.0234 -0.0615** -0.0272 -0.0483*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0190) (0.0233) (0.0297) (0.0260) (0.0371) (0.0183) 
1780-1786 (0/1)        0.0100 
        (0.0221) 
post1786 (0/1)        -0.0249 
        (0.0263) 
         
Mean 0.546 0.564 0.604 0.511 0.703 0.539 0.604 0.631 
Observations 5,702 5,420 3,095 2,325 1,227 1,868 3,095 7,794 
R-squared 0.062 0.076 0.082 0.067 0.061 0.072 0.084 0.067 
                  
Offense f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Month f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Judge f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control var. (incl. jury) no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Off. group specific linear trends no no no no no no yes no 
NOTE- The table shows the results for the baseline regressions corresponding to estimating equation (2). The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating a guilty jury 
verdict (conviction). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Table 9. Baseline results –Abolition of transportation and convictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Offense: All All All All All 
            
post1852 (0/1) -0.0225** -0.0222** 0.0096 -0.0363*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0186) (0.0113) (0.0111) 
high transportation offense    0.0228 0.0050 
    (0.0366) (0.0359) 
post1852 x high transportation 
offense    0.0249 0.0239 
    (0.0204) (0.0200) 
      
Mean 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.710 0.710 
Observations 11,026 10,972 10,972 10,323 10,272 
R-squared 0.062 0.101 0.101 0.052 0.092 
           
Offense f.e. yes yes yes yes yes 
Month f.e. yes yes yes yes yes 
Control var.  no yes yes no yes 
Linear trend no no yes no no 
NOTE- The table shows the results for the baseline regressions corresponding to estimating equation (3). The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating a guilty jury verdict (conviction). Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own calculations. 
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Appendix Table 1. Capital punishment eligibility, reform years and act names 
 
Offense Law Treatment years 
Panel  A. Property offenses 
Animal theft An act for abolishing the Punishment of Death in certain cases, 
and substituting a lesser punishment in lieu thereof (1832) 1832 
Arson Burning of Buildings, etc. Act (1837) 1856 
Burglary An act to Amend the Laws realting to Burglary and Stealing in a 
Dwelling house (1837) 1837 
Housebreaking Criminal law act (1833) 1833 
Larceny - practically never 
eligible 
Mail An act for abolishing capital punishment in cases of letter-
stealing and sacrilege (1834) 1834 
Receiving - 1837 
Shoplifting Stealing in Shops Act (1820) 1820 
Stealing from 
master 
- never eligible 
Theft from place An act for abolishing the Punishment of Death in certain cases, 
and substituting a lesser punishment in lieu thereof (1832) 1832 
Panel B. Violent and sex offenses 
Assault -  
Manslaughter - never eligible 
Murder - always eligible 
Robbery An act to Amend the Laws relating to Robbery and Stealing from 
the Person (1837) 1837 
Rape Substitution of Punishments for Death Act (1841) 1841 
Sexual assault - never eligible 
Sodomy An act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law of England and 
Ireland relating to Offences against the Person (1861) 1832 (1860) 
Wounding Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Offences against the Person 
(1837) 
An Act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law of England 
and Ireland relating to Offfences against the Person (1861) 
1837 (1861) 
Panel C. Fraud offenses 
Coining offenses Coinage Offences Acts (1832) 1832 
Embezzlement - practically never 
eligible 
Forgery An Act for abolishing the Punishment of Death in certain Cases 
of Forgery (1832) 1832 
Fraud - 1813 
Panel D. Other offenses 
Bigamy - not eligible 
Libel - not eligible 
Perjury - not eligible 
Perverting justice  - 1831 
NOTE- The table indicates the punishment eligibility for capital punishment for each offense in the analysis 
sample. SOURCE- The Old Bailey Proceedings Online, various sources as specified in the text (laws) and own 
calculations. 
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Appendix Figure 1. Examples from original text of law  
 
SOURCE- UK Parliamentary Archives. 
